The narrowest pipe in the nuclear fuel cycle. Scenario simulator beta.
Conversion is the chemistry step that turns mined yellowcake (raw uranium oxide concentrate) into UF6 — the gas form that gets fed into centrifuges. About ten conversion facilities show up on this map if you count intermediates, restarts, and domestic-only sites; only five run at commercial export scale, and the West operates four of them. When US, UK, and EU restrictions on Russian conversion fully phase in, Western reactors have to source from that same handful of plants. The hard deadline is January 2028, when waivers under the 2024 Russian Uranium Imports Act (PL 118-62) expire. Capacity moves on multi-year timelines. Restarts and ramps are the entire margin of safety.
Two charts, one timeline. Top: when each Western conversion plant was operating. Bottom: total Western capacity against Western reactor demand. The red wedge between them is the gap Russia currently fills.
Three Western plants closed or idled between 1992 and 2017 (Sequoyah, Springfields, Honeywell Metropolis) cutting capacity nearly in half. Demand fell post-Fukushima too as Japan's reactors went offline, but capacity fell faster. By 2020 the West produced roughly 21k tU/yr against ~42k of demand. Russia (TENEX) sold the difference. The dashed red line marks January 2028, when waivers under the 2024 Russian Uranium Imports Act (PL 118-62) expire and the West has to cover its own reactors.
Capacity figures from operator archives (Honeywell / ConverDyn, Cameco AIF, Areva / Orano Comurhex history, BNFL Springfields, Sequoyah Fuels closure records) plus WNA Nuclear Fuel Report excerpts and NEI Magazine; projection from current operator filings. Western demand curve combines WNA Nuclear Fuel Report 2023 reference scenario, NEI 2001 conversion analysis, OECD-NEA Trends in NFC, and NS Energy / ERI summaries — global UF6 demand minus Russian (Rosatom) and Chinese (CNNC) captive shares. 1980-1985 estimated from fleet-buildout endpoints; 2030 is the WNA Reference midpoint of a 55-62k range. Year-by-year shape is illustrative, not authoritative.
The smaller conversion lines that exist — and why they don't move the global supply needle.
A long tail of smaller UF6 conversion lines exists outside the ten commercial-scale facilities mapped above, but none of them moves global supply. Argentina's Pilcaniyeu plant runs at roughly 60 tU/yr and is the basis for a proposed NANO Nuclear / Dioxitek scale-up that has not yet broken ground. Japan's Ningyo-toge pilot ran 1982-2001 at about 200 tU/yr and is now dismantled, leaving Japan fully import-dependent. Iran's Esfahan UCF, nominally 200 tU/yr, suffered extensive damage in the June 2025 US and Israeli airstrikes. Pakistan's Dera Ghazi Khan (~200 tU/yr) and South Africa's old Valindaba Y-Plant (decommissioned 1990) were and are weapons-program lines, not commercial supply. North Korea, India's RMP at Mysore, and Russia's legacy Glazov and Angarsk lines round out a fragmented historical map. Combined, these facilities account for under 1,000 tU/yr of viable output — a rounding error against ~62-65k tU/yr of global reactor demand.
Toggle the Smaller / non-commercial filter above to show or hide them on the globe.
The numbers behind the page, with where each came from.
Capacity figures sourced quarterly from operator filings (Cameco MD&A, Orano Annual Activity Report, ConverDyn / Solstice disclosures, Westinghouse). Mining production figures and country shares from WNA. Reactor counts from IAEA PRIS. Where a number is contested or stale, the side panel shows a data quality badge — official disclosure, industry estimate, or last-known-public. Russian and Chinese figures carry the most uncertainty; Seversk's last detailed disclosure was 2012.
Records are hand-curated from the WNA Nuclear Fuel Report, IAEA INFCIS, and operator filings (Cameco MD&A, Orano Annual Activity Report, ConverDyn / Solstice disclosures, Westinghouse, INB, NFC, WISE Uranium). Each capacity number lists its source and a data-quality flag — official disclosure, industry estimate, or last-known-public. Russian and Chinese figures are weaker; Seversk's last detailed disclosure was 2012.
Capacities are reported in tonnes uranium contained as UF6 per year (tU/yr). The Malvési facility is shown at its UF4 intermediate stage, which feeds Pierrelatte downstream. Restricted-entity highlighting reflects US Public Law 118-62 (Russian Uranium Imports Act, signed May 2024, effective Aug 2024, sunset Dec 2040) and parallel UK / EU restrictions.
News ticker pulls daily from World Nuclear News, NucNet, NEI, DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Cameco IR, and Google News fallback queries. Filtered to entries that mention a tracked facility or operator.
Conversion is the chemistry step that turns mined yellowcake (raw uranium oxide concentrate) into UF6 — the gas form that gets fed into centrifuges. About ten conversion facilities show up on this map if you count intermediates, restarts, and domestic-only sites; only five run at commercial export scale, and the West operates four of them. When US, UK, and EU restrictions on Russian conversion fully phase in, Western reactors have to source from that same handful of plants. The hard deadline is January 2028, when waivers under the 2024 Russian Uranium Imports Act (PL 118-62) expire. Capacity moves on multi-year timelines. Restarts and ramps are the entire margin of safety.